The following is taken from: http://trinities.org/blog/archives/2872#more-2872
another round from Steve Hays.
This is my last entry in the discussion; I may or may not comment, but no more posts.
Again, this is what I hear from him:
- Yes, the divine nature is a universal, shared by the Three. But let’s not make any Platonic assumptions about forms/universals being in some other realm than what has them, or being more fundamental.
Indeed, let’s not.
Are the persons parts of the Trinity, for him?
He brings up the Mandelbrot set. This is an abstract object. It doesn’t have parts, but rather members. Is he suggesting that the Trinity is a set, with members rather than parts? That it has infinite members? I don’t know.
Then, a digression about analogy. Of course, my point was:don’t you think God is literally a self? (Not: Is God analogous to a self?)
Perhaps he assumes that all terms that apply to God do so only analogically. I think that’s obviously false; we have terms that express concepts abstract to be satisfied by either God or a creature. e.g. “exists,” “conscious,” “similar to God.”
Or maybe he’s just worried about painting himself into the Quaternity corner.
I think Tuggy is now insinuating that the Trinity devolves into the Quaternity.
There goes that Tuggy again, insinuating things about thedoctrine! No, the subject is just: what Steve Hays thinks.
The Trinity would not be a “self” in the same sense that the constituent members are “selves.” The Trinity is not a fourth person, over and above the three persons. Rather, each person is conscious of what the other two are conscious of. Not just that each person is conscious of the other two persons, but conscious of their consciousness.
So no, the Trinity isn’t a self in the same sense each person is. This conveniently leaves it an open question whether or not it is a self in any other sense, and whether it’s literally a self, or only analogous to a self.
But perhaps his final answer is that it (the Trinity) really is an it, not a he.
The “owner” of the “corporate viewpoint” is each member of the Trinity. That’s because each person not only has his own first-person viewpoint, but is also privy to the viewpoint of the other two.
I conclude, then, that in his view there are three, not four conscious beings here, and three points of view. It’s just that each also can (and always does, I assume) adopt the viewpoint of both the others.
About his “data” of revelation; he’s unable to see that some of these are precisely what are at issue. In other words, he begs the question, because he’s not able to adopt the perspective of those he would refute.
Now, finally: I switch to brief criticism:
This looks to me basically like a poorly developed “social” Trinity theory
We have three beings here, each of which fully has the property of divinity. Thus, it looks like we have three gods. Yes, I know that surely he intends it to be monotheistic. So, the theory seems inconsistent.
What is the Trinity? A group? A composite thing? A set with members? A quasi-self? He doesn’t know. But it seems that he wants to deny the one God to literally be a self. If so, he goes hard against the Bible, throughout. God knows, acts, gets mad, makes and carries out plans, stands in an I-thou relationship to Jesus, as well as to disciples of Jesus. Further, I’m willing to bet that like just about all Christians, he interacts with God as a self to a self.
Evidently, Steve hopes that positing perfect mental accessbetween the three deities will somehow imply their being one god. But, that has not been shown. It looks like a picture of three gods with perfect access to each others’ minds.
I think this is all a poor fit with the Bible.
But laying aside that, is it creedally orthodox? Not clear. While the creeds say that all three must be “homoousios”, they also say that the Son is true God from true God. In Steve’s theory, does the Son derive his existence or divinity from the Father? I don’t know. All he’s said is that all three equally and fully possess divinity. So, I don’t know if his theory is orthodox by (small-c) catholic standards.
Update: as of 7/5/11, lots more long posts, with lots of accusations, flailing away to find some obvious confusion in my own views, but never addressing this monotheism objection. To the creedal worry, his answer is that being a Protestant, he doesn’t care if it is creedal or not. Fair enough. I’ve commented quite a bit over there, probably too much.
assalamu3laykum
ReplyDeletelong time ago, on soc.religion.islam
a guy called imran aijaz responded to denis giron.he used the arguments of christian philosopher to unravel trinity
this discussion took place in 2002
http://groups.google.com/group/soc.religion.islam/msg/4073e4b9f371e337
We can schematize Scotus's proof as follows (this is my own rough version):
1. The First Nature [God] is not caused [i.e. is a necessary being].
1.1 Whatever is uncaused lacks matter and form.
1.2 The First Nature is uncaused.
1.3 The Firt Nature lacks matter and form.
2. The First Nature does not have (distinctive) diverse perfections.
2.1 Suppose (hypothetically) the First Nature had two distinctive
perfections, X and Y.
2.2 Either X or Y would be the reason why the whole is a necessary being.
2.3 If X is sufficient to make the First Nature a necessary being, then Y
is unnecessary. Conversely, if Y is sufficient to make the First Nature
a necessary being, then X is unnecessary.
2.4 Therefore, either X or Y is unnecessary.
2.5 Therefore, [a composite] First Nature would not be a necessary being,
since it contains a portion that is not necessary [X or Y].
2.6 If it is said that X and Y simultaneously constitute the necessity of
the First Nature being a necessary being, then it would be a necessary
being twice over.
2.6.1 The First Nature would have two beings neither of which would
necessarily include the other.
2.6.2 X would not be Y (nor would Y be X) since they would not be the
primary source of necessary existence. If they were, they would
not constitute one entity.
2.6.3 No single thing would result from X and Y, nor will there be a
difference between them.
---------------------------------------------------------
3. Therefore, the First Nature is simple [non-composite].
Now, it must be said that Scotus is not an easy writer to understand. It is
not without good reason he earned the title of the 'Subtle Doctor'. Now, as
much as I am impressed by Scotus's writings, I am surprised that he provided
us with the thread that will unravel the doctrine of the trinity which he
held himself. So let's take Scotus's framework and apply it to the doctrine
of the trinity. God, it is said, is composed of X, Y and Z - they have the
same essence but different particulars which make them distinct. Now Scotus
would ask (since X, Y and Z 'make up' God as a necessary being) which of
the three is the reason that the whole (X + Y + Z) is necessary? Let us now
suppose that X is the reason why the whole is necessary. This is makes Y and
Z impotent (more importantly, it makes them contingent, and thus they cannot
be eternal). What if it is suggested that the necessary being = X + Y + Z?
Now, althought this particular exegesis of mine is debatable, it seems to me
that what Scotus is saying here is that such as being would be necessary
"thrice over" - implicit here is the contention that if X, Y and Z were
contingent entities, then how can contingent + contingent + contingent =
non-contingent? - since, if all three were necessary beings *on their own*,
they would have no need for the other two. If X was a necessary being, say,
it would necessarily exclude Y and Z (necessity is a sufficient condition
for excluding Y and Z).
The eternity of three necessary beings causes more
ReplyDeleteproblems because, should such a thing be the cause, they would be three
*distinct* beings - i.e. the scenario would be tritheistic - which of course
we need not go into since orthodox Christianity has always rejected this
particular claim, to eclipse the 'Shema' of classical Judaism (Deut. 6:4).
The trinity, therefore, seems to be 'contingently necessary' (remember, X, Y
and Z are sharing an essence), which al-Kindi rejects by claiming that it
implies that the eternal is not eternal which is of course, a contradiction.
I hope that makes sense, I had to read this posting of mine a couple of times
over to make sure it didn't get too messy.
DO ME A SMALL FAVOUR BRO
Show me how the above argument can plug into to what you recently poseted
ross